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Scoring rules and abnormally low bids criteria in construction tenders: a taxonomic review

Ballesteros-Pérez, P., Skitmore, M., Pellicer, E. and González-Cruz, M. C. (2015) Scoring rules and abnormally low bids criteria in construction tenders: a taxonomic review. Construction Management and Economics, 33 (4). pp. 259-278. ISSN 0144-6193

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To link to this item DOI: 10.1080/01446193.2015.1059951

Abstract/Summary

In the global construction context, the best value or most economically advantageous tender is becoming a widespread approach for contractor selection, as an alternative to other traditional awarding criteria such as the lowest price. In these multi-attribute tenders, the owner or auctioneer solicits proposals containing both a price bid and additional technical features. Once the proposals are received, each bidder’s price bid is given an economic score according to a scoring rule, generally called an economic scoring formula (ESF) and a technical score according to pre-specified criteria. Eventually, the contract is awarded to the bidder with the highest weighted overall score (economic + technical). However, economic scoring formula selection by auctioneers is invariably and paradoxically a highly intuitive process in practice, involving few theoretical or empirical considerations, despite having been considered traditionally and mistakenly as objective, due to its mathematical nature. This paper provides a taxonomic classification of a wide variety of ESFs and abnormally low bids criteria (ALBC) gathered in several countries with different tendering approaches. Practical implications concern the optimal design of price scoring rules in construction contract tenders, as well as future analyses of the effects of the ESF and ALBC on competitive bidding behaviour.

Item Type:Article
Refereed:Yes
Divisions:No Reading authors. Back catalogue items
Faculty of Science > School of the Built Environment > Construction Management and Engineering > Business Innovation in Construction
ID Code:51064
Publisher:Taylor & Francis

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