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Do non-philosophers think epistemic consequentialism is counterintuitive?

Andow, J. (2017) Do non-philosophers think epistemic consequentialism is counterintuitive? Synthese, 194 (7). pp. 2631-2643. ISSN 1573-0964

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To link to this item DOI: 10.1007/s11229-016-1071-7

Abstract/Summary

Direct epistemic consequentialism is the idea that X is epistemically permissible iff X maximizes epistemic value. It has received lots of attention in recent years and is widely accepted by philosophers to have counterintuitive implications. There are various reasons one might suspect that the relevant intuitions will not be widely shared among non-philosophers. This paper presents an initial empirical study of ordinary intuitions. The results of two experiments demonstrate that the counterintuitiveness of epistemic consequentialism is more than a philosophers' worry---the folk seem to agree!

Item Type:Article
Refereed:Yes
Divisions:Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Humanities > Philosophy
ID Code:59391
Publisher:Springer

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