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A partial defence of descriptive evidentialism about intuitions: a reply to Molyneux

Andow, J. (2017) A partial defence of descriptive evidentialism about intuitions: a reply to Molyneux. Metaphilosophy, 48 (1-2). pp. 183-195. ISSN 1467-9973

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To link to this item DOI: 10.1111/meta.12225

Abstract/Summary

Bernard Molyneux presents some new arguments against descriptive evidentialism about intuitions. Descriptive evidentialism is the thesis that philosophers use intuitions as evidence. Molyneux's arguments are that: (1) the propositions that intuition putatively supports are treated as having a degree and kind of certainty and justification that they could not have got from being intuited; (2) intuitions influence us in ways we cannot explain by supposing we treat them as evidence; and (3) certain strong intuitions that persuade us of their contents are treated as inadmissible in the context of justification. This article presents a partial defence of descriptive evidentialism against these new arguments.

Item Type:Article
Refereed:Yes
Divisions:Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Humanities > Philosophy
ID Code:69024
Publisher:Blackwell Publishing

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