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Lay intuitions about epistemic normativity

Roberts, P., Andow, J. and Schmitdtke, K. A. (2018) Lay intuitions about epistemic normativity. Synthese, 195 (7). pp. 3267-3287. ISSN 1573-0964

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To link to this item DOI: 10.1007/s11229-017-1371-6

Abstract/Summary

Recent empirical work on non-philosophers’ intuitions about epistemic normativity reveals patterns that cannot be fully accounted for by direct epistemic consequentialism. On the basis of these results, one might picture participants as “epistemic deontologists.” We present the results of two new experiments that support a more nuanced picture. We examine intuitions about guesses and hypotheses, and about beliefs. Our results suggest a two-factor model of intuitions, wherein both consequentialist and non-consequentialist considerations affect participants’ judgments about epistemic permissibility.

Item Type:Article
Refereed:Yes
Divisions:Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Humanities > Philosophy
ID Code:69460
Publisher:Springer

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