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Epistemic consequentialism, truth fairies and worse fairies

Andow, J. (2017) Epistemic consequentialism, truth fairies and worse fairies. Philosophia, 45 (3). pp. 987-993. ISSN 1574-9274

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To link to this item DOI: 10.1007/s11406-017-9833-0

Abstract/Summary

Direct Epistemic Consequentialism faces the Truth Fairy. Indirect Epistemic Consequentialism promises to avoid this issue. But there are worse fairies than the Truth Fairy. There is the Worse Fairy. The case of the Worse Fairy helps demonstrate that epistemic consequentialists who would solve problems like the Truth Fairy by ‘going indirect’ face a dilemma.

Item Type:Article
Refereed:Yes
Divisions:Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Humanities > Philosophy
ID Code:70002
Publisher:Springer Verlag

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