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Are intuitions about moral relevance susceptible to framing effects?

Andow, J. (2018) Are intuitions about moral relevance susceptible to framing effects? Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 9 (1). pp. 115-141. ISSN 1878-5158

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To link to this item DOI: 10.1007/s13164-017-0352-5

Abstract/Summary

Various studies have reported that moral intuitions about the permissibility of acts are subject to framing effects. This paper reports the results of a series of experiments which further examine the susceptibility of moral intuitions to framing effects. The main aim was to test recent speculation that intuitions about the moral relevance of certain properties of cases might be relatively resistent to framing effects. If correct, this would provide a certain type of moral intuitionist with the resources to resist challenges to the reliability of moral intuitions based on such framing effects. And, fortunately for such intuitionists, although the results can’t be used to mount a strident defence of intuitionism, the results do serve to shift the burden of proof onto those who would claim that intuitions about moral relevance are problematically sensitive to framing effects.

Item Type:Article
Refereed:Yes
Divisions:Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Humanities > Philosophy
ID Code:71059
Publisher:Springer

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