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The impact of possible-offer announcements on the wealth effect of target firms

Li, H. and Zhou, D. (2019) The impact of possible-offer announcements on the wealth effect of target firms. European Journal of Finance, 25 (15). pp. 1440-1461. ISSN 1466-4364

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To link to this item DOI: 10.1080/1351847X.2019.1601120

Abstract/Summary

The stock market materially and positively responds to released information on possible offers, likely because such announcements signal the high probability that formal bids will be offered. If potential takeover discussions are revealed earlier, then target shareholders will gain significantly lower abnormal returns around the time of when formal offers are announced. Financial bidders are less likely to approach targets with earlier possible offers; however, if they do offer possible takeovers, they need to pay incrementally higher bid premiums in their formal offers. The reform inherent in the UK Takeover Code of 2011 weakens a bidder’s willingness to offer possible takeovers. The pre-reform effects of possible offers on the wealth effect of targets differ from those seen after the reform.

Item Type:Article
Refereed:Yes
Divisions:Henley Business School > Business Informatics, Systems and Accounting
ID Code:82850
Publisher:Taylor and Francis

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