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The myth of the common-sense conception of colour

Adams, Z. and Hansen, N. (2020) The myth of the common-sense conception of colour. In: Marques, T. and Wikforss, Å. (eds.) Shifting Concepts: The Philosophy and Psychology of Conceptual Variability. Oxford University Press, pp. 106-127. ISBN 9780198803331 (In Press)

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Abstract/Summary

Some philosophical theories of the nature of color aim to respect a "common sense" conception of color: aligning with the common sense conception is supposed to speak in favor of a theory and conflicting with it is supposed to speak against a theory. In this paper, we argue that the idea of a "common sense" conception of color that philosophers of color have relied upon is overly simplistic. By drawing on experimental and historical evidence, we show how conceptions of color vary along several dimensions and how even supposedly "core" components of the contemporary "common sense" conception of color are less stable than they have been thought to be.

Item Type:Book or Report Section
Refereed:Yes
Divisions:Interdisciplinary centres and themes > Centre for Cognition Research (CCR)
Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Humanities > Philosophy
ID Code:89208
Publisher:Oxford University Press

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