Abstract/Summary

Technological advances are accelerating the ability of States and other actors to collect and disseminate information. Intelligence relevant to armed conflicts can be gathered far from hostilities and then instantly passed to the front line. The importance of information and connectivity on the near-future battlefield means that States must invest in close inter-State intelligence relationships and standing infrastructure. This thesis examines how the law of neutrality will apply to intelligence sharing and associated infrastructure during international armed conflict. In particular, it examines how both traditional (‘strict’) and more recent (‘qualified’) approaches to neutrality may apply when non-party States seek to share intelligence with belligerents, and assesses which of these States may lawfully rely on. First, the history of neutrality law’s development and the basics of its application are considered as important context. Next, the application of strict neutrality to intelligence sharing is analysed, demonstrating the restrictions this approach imposes even if the recipient belligerent is a victim of aggression. The duty on States to limit intelligence sharing by non-State actors within their jurisdiction is also considered. The thesis then turns to (publicly known) recent State practice, noting that this has rarely adhered to strict neutrality’s requirements. Finally, it considers qualified neutrality and other international law justifications for sharing with belligerents. It argues that strict neutrality is a relic of the nineteenth century out of step with modern international law, and that States may in some circumstances lawfully qualify their neutrality to aid victims of aggression. There may also be other justifications or excuses for doing so, such as self-defence and conduct of collective countermeasures.