A game theory analysis of regional innovation ecosystems
Shakiba, H. Full text not archived in this repository. It is advisable to refer to the publisher's version if you intend to cite from this work. See Guidance on citing. To link to this item DOI: 10.1007/s10961-024-10131-4 Abstract/SummaryDespite the popularity of innovation ecosystems in the regional studies literature, the organization of knowledge cooperation and transfer within these ecosystems remains largely unexplored, particularly in countries and regions where the government plays a significant role. Regional studies and innovation literature have not addressed how and under which conditions actors start cooperation in the ecosystem, often assuming that knowledge cooperation between agents is a truism. This paper employs a Game Theory approach to examine the knowledge cooperation networks within the Nishapur Innovation Ecosystem. The model results demonstrated that seven key actors are pivotal in explaining knowledge cooperation within the ecosystem. Eighteen feasible states were identified based on the actors and their strategies. Results indicated that with the current actors and their current preferences, the current state is most likely to continue, therefore, the probability of operationalizing one model of behavior in the Nishapur innovation ecosystem is low. The results obtained from the reverse game analysis revealed that appropriate regional policies are required to ensure that the ecosystem is socially, economically, and environmentally sustainable.
Altmetric Deposit Details University Staff: Request a correction | Centaur Editors: Update this record |