Creditor rights and the market power-stability relationship in banking

Full text not archived in this repository.

Please see our End User Agreement.

It is advisable to refer to the publisher's version if you intend to cite from this work. See Guidance on citing.

Add to AnyAdd to TwitterAdd to FacebookAdd to LinkedinAdd to PinterestAdd to Email

Biswas, S. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3124-5070 (2019) Creditor rights and the market power-stability relationship in banking. Journal of Financial Stability, 40. pp. 53-63. ISSN 1878-0962 doi: 10.1016/j.jfs.2017.10.001

Abstract/Summary

I use the staggered passage of creditor rights reforms in 13 countries to examine how changes in creditor rights affect (a) bank stability and (b) the bank market power-stability relationship. (a) There is statistically weak evidence that stronger creditor rights enhance bank stability; the result is not robust across specifications. (b) Market power positively affects stability. However, there is asymmetry in the effect of market power on stability, depending on whether there is an increase or a decrease in creditor rights. The market power-stability relationship is stronger when a country weakens its creditor rights vis-á-vis when it strengthens its creditor rights.

Altmetric Badge

Item Type Article
URI https://centaur.reading.ac.uk/id/eprint/123834
Identification Number/DOI 10.1016/j.jfs.2017.10.001
Refereed Yes
Divisions Henley Business School > Finance and Accounting
Publisher Elsevier
Download/View statistics View download statistics for this item

University Staff: Request a correction | Centaur Editors: Update this record