Abstract/Summary

This paper reviews the impact of the global financial crisis on financial system reform in China. Scholars and practitioners have critically questioned the efficiencies of the Anglo- American principal-agent model of corporate governance which promotes shareholder-value maximisation. Should China continue to follow the U.K.-U.S. path in relation to financial reform? This conceptual paper provides an insightful review of the corporate governance literature, regulatory reports and news articles from the financial press. After examining the fundamental limitations of the laissez-faire philosophy that underpins the neo-liberal model of capitalism, the paper considers the risks in opening up China’s financial markets and relaxing monetary and fiscal policies. The paper outlines a critique of shareholder-capitalism in relation to the German team-production model of corporate governance, promoting a “social market economy” styled capitalism. Through such analysis, the paper explores numerous implications for China to consider in terms of developing a new and sustainable corporate governance model. China needs to follow its own financial reform through understanding its particular economy. The global financial crisis might help China rethink the nature of corporate governance, identify its weakness and assess the current reform agenda.