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Deal size, acquisition premia and shareholder gains

Alexandridis, G., Fuller, K., Terhaar, L. and Travlos, N. (2013) Deal size, acquisition premia and shareholder gains. Journal of Corporate Finance, 20. pp. 1-13. ISSN 0929-1199

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To link to this item DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2012.10.006


This study examines the contradictory predictions regarding the association between the premium paid in acquisitions and deal size. We document a robust negative relation between offer premia and target size, indicating that acquirers tend to pay less for large firms, not more. We also find that the overpayment potential is lower in acquisitions of large targets. Yet, they still destroy more value for acquirers around deal announcements, implying that target size may proxy, among others, for the unobserved complexity inherent in large deals. We provide evidence in favor of this interpretation.

Item Type:Article
Divisions:Henley Business School > ICMA Centre
ID Code:29004

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