Abstract/Summary

Along with other corporate governance principles, disclosure plays an essential role in protecting shareholders, raising corporate performance and reducing the risk of financial crises. In order to improve corporate governance disclosure, it is necessary to understand the context in which it takes place, but so far, there has been little consideration in the literature of the impact that institutions have on corporate governance disclosure and practice, especially in the Meddle East and North Africa MENA countries. This research responds to this gap by shedding light on the recent development of CG disclosure and practice in Libyan commercial banks. This sector, which plays an important role in the Libyan economy, has seen significant CG reforms in recent years; the research investigates how banks have responded to these reforms and to international corporate governance disclosure requirements. Data for the study were collected in two stages: first from banks’ annual reports and websites, and then via semi-structured interviews with key actors in the banking sector. These actors were drawn from a range of stakeholder groups having a particular interest in corporate governance. The interviews sought to investigate their perceptions of the institutions that have had/are having an impact on the development of corporate governance disclosure and practice in Libya. The findings suggest that despite the reforms, Libyan commercial banks have responded to the corporate governance disclosure requirements to only a very limited extent, and that they disclose much less than companies in the developing countries. The main institutions influencing CG disclosure and practice in Libyan commercial banks appear to be the bureaucratic state, kinship networks, the political context and the law. The bureaucratic state, as represented in the Central Bank of Libya, has had a positive impact by enforcing regulation and supporting banks to change their practice, but other institutions have hindered progress; for example, the traditional emphasis on kinship has undermined the independence of boards and helped foster a culture of secrecy, while political instability has led banks to regard CG as a less urgent priority. Two other institution (religion and market) were shown to have no impact on the development of corporate governance disclosure and practice in Libyan society. The study gives new insights into the influence of institutions on CG disclosure and practice in one MENA country facing significant political change. It discusses the implications of these findings, including how to mitigate the negative impacts and maximize the positive ones, before offering suggestions for future research.