Motivated monitoring by institutional investors and firm investment efficiencyWard, C., Yin, C. and Zeng, Y. (2020) Motivated monitoring by institutional investors and firm investment efficiency. European Financial Management, 26 (2). pp. 348-385. ISSN 1468-036X
It is advisable to refer to the publisher's version if you intend to cite from this work. See Guidance on citing. To link to this item DOI: 10.1111/eufm.12232 Abstract/SummaryWe find that motivated monitoring by institutional investors mitigates firm investment inefficiency, estimated by Richardson's (2006) approach. This relation is robust when using the annual reconstitution of the Russell indexes as exogenous shocks to institutional ownership during the period 1995–2015 and after classifying institutional ownership by institution type. We also show that closer monitoring mitigates the problem of both over‐investing free cash flows and under‐investment due to managers’ career concerns. Finally, we document that the effectiveness of the monitoring by institutional investors appears to increase monotonically with respect to the firm's relative importance in their portfolios.
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