Roberts, P., Andow, J. and Schmitdtke, K. A. (2018) Lay intuitions about epistemic normativity. Synthese, 195 (7). pp. 3267-3287. ISSN 1573-0964 doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1371-6

Andow, J. (2018) Are intuitions about moral relevance susceptible to framing effects? Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 9 (1). pp. 115-141. ISSN 1878-5158 doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-017-0352-5

Andow, J. (2017) Epistemic consequentialism, truth fairies and worse fairies. Philosophia, 45 (3). pp. 987-993. ISSN 1574-9274 doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-017-9833-0

Andow, J. (2017) Do non-philosophers think epistemic consequentialism is counterintuitive? Synthese, 194 (7). pp. 2631-2643. ISSN 1573-0964 doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1071-7

Andow, J. (2017) Intuition-talk: virus or virtue? Philosophia, 45 (2). pp. 523-531. ISSN 1574-9274 doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-016-9796-6

Andow, J. (2017) A partial defence of descriptive evidentialism about intuitions: a reply to Molyneux. Metaphilosophy, 48 (1-2). pp. 183-195. ISSN 1467-9973 doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/meta.12225

Andow, J. (2016) Reliable but not home free? What framing effects mean for moral intuitions. Philosophical Psychology, 29 (6). pp. 904-911. ISSN 1465-394X doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2016.1168794

Andow, J. (2016) Abduction by philosophers: reorienting philosophical methodology. Metaphilosophy, 47 (3). pp. 353-370. ISSN 1467-9973 doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/meta.12191

Andow, J. (2016) Intuitions. Analysis, 76 (2). pp. 232-246. ISSN 1467-8284 doi: https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anv062

Andow, J. (2016) Thin, fine and with sensitivity: a metamethodology of intuitions. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 7 (1). pp. 105-125. ISSN 1878-5158 doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-015-0247-2

Andow, J. (2016) Zebras, intransigence & semantic apocalypse: problems for dispositional metasemantics. Philosophia, 44 (1). pp. 53-62. ISSN 1574-9274 doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-015-9684-5

Andow, J. (2016) Qualitative tools & experimental philosophy. Philosophical Psychology, 29 (8). pp. 1128-1141. ISSN 1465-394X doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2016.1224826

Andow, J. and Cova, F. (2016) Why compatibilist intuitions are not mistaken: a reply to Feltz and Millan. Philosophical Psychology, 29 (4). pp. 550-566. ISSN 1465-394X doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2015.1082542

Andow, J. (2015) How distinctive is philosophers’ intuition talk? Metaphilosophy, 46 (4-5). pp. 515-538. ISSN 1467-9973 doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/meta.12151

Andow, J. (2015) Expecting moral philosophers to be reliable. Dialectica, 69 (2). pp. 205-220. ISSN 1746-8361 doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/1746-8361.12092

Andow, J. (2015) How “intuition” exploded. Metaphilosophy, 46 (2). pp. 189-212. ISSN 1467-9973 doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/meta.12127

Andow, J. (2015) A semantic solution to the problem with aesthetic testimony. Acta Analytica, 30 (2). pp. 211-218. ISSN 0353-5150 doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-014-0238-4

Roberts, P., Andow, J. and Schmitdke, K. (2014) Colour relationalism and the real deliverances of introspection. Erkenntnis, 79 (5). pp. 1173-1189. ISSN 1572-8420 doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-014-9600-6

Andow, J. (2014) Intuitions, disagreement and referential pluralism. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 5 (2). pp. 223-239. ISSN 1878-5158 doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-013-0166-z

Andow, J. (2013) Intuitions in the Face of Diversity. PhD thesis, University of Nottingham.