Cognitive and bodily selves: how do they interact following brain lesion?
Rossetti, Y., Holmes, N., Rode, G. and Farne, A. (2010) Cognitive and bodily selves: how do they interact following brain lesion? In: Fuchs, T., Sattel, H. and Henningsen, P. (eds.) The embodied self: dimensions, coherence and disorders. Schattauer Verlag, Stuttgart, pp. 117-133. ISBN 9783794527915
Dualism has long distinguished between the mental and the body experiences. Probing the structure and organisation of the self traditionally calls for a distinction between these two sides of the self coin. It is far beyond the scope of this chapter to address these philosophical issues, and our starting point will be the simple distinction between reflective processes involved in the elaboration of body image, self awareness and self-recognition (i.e. ‘the self’) and the sensori-motor dialogues involved in action control, reactions and automatisms (i.e. ‘the body’ schema). This oversimplification does not take into account the complex interactions taking place between these two levels of description, but our initial aim will be to distinguish between them, before addressing the question of their interactions. Cognitive and sensori-motor processes have frequently been distinguished (review: Rossetti and Revonsuo 2000), and it may be proposed that a similar dissociation can be put forward, a priori, between a central representation of self and a bodily representation corresponding to body schema (Figure 1).