Fast and frugal framing effects?
McCloy, R. A., Beaman, C. P., Frosch, C. A. and Goddard, K. (2010) Fast and frugal framing effects? Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory & Cognition, 36 (4). pp. 1043-1052. ISSN 1939-1285
To link to this article DOI: 10.1037/a0019693
Three experiments examine whether simple pair-wise comparison judgments, involving the “recognition heuristic” (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002), are sensitive to implicit cues to the nature of the comparison required. Experiments 1 & 2 show that participants frequently choose the recognized option of a pair if asked to make “larger” judgments but are significantly less likely to choose the unrecognized option when asked to make “smaller” judgments. Experiment 3 demonstrates that, overall, participants consider recognition to be a more reliable guide to judgments of a magnitude criterion than lack of recognition and that this intuition drives the framing effect. These results support the idea that, when making pair-wise comparison judgments, inferring that the recognized item is large is simpler than inferring that the unrecognized item is small.
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