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Fairness in hazmat routing-scheduling: a bi-objective Stackelberg game

Mohri, S., Asgari, N., Farahini, R. Z., Bourlakis, M. and Laker, B. (2020) Fairness in hazmat routing-scheduling: a bi-objective Stackelberg game. Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, 140. 102006. ISSN 1366-5545

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To link to this item DOI: 10.1016/j.tre.2020.102006

Abstract/Summary

We investigate a hazmat routing-scheduling problem. To minimize the overall expected risk, various vehicles may take different routes/schedules to avoid multiple accidents on the same link. Therefore, the company envisages two issues: (1) unfairly, a vehicle departing earlier from its origin may arrive earlier at its destination than the others leaving later; (2) focusing only on the minimization of risk may increase travel time/cost incurred by the company. We suggest a bi-objective game-theoretic formulation and solve it by a modified Adaptive Large Neighborhood Search and Simulated Annealing. We test the solution on a real-life case and extract practical insights.

Item Type:Article
Refereed:Yes
Divisions:Henley Business School > Leadership, Organisations and Behaviour
ID Code:91125
Publisher:Elsevier

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