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Game of regional environmental policy: Europe and US

Asproudis, E., Khan, N. and Korac-Kakabadse, N. (2019) Game of regional environmental policy: Europe and US. Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, 19 (1). pp. 1-20. ISSN 1566-1679

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To link to this item DOI: 10.1007/s10842-018-0274-7


We analyse a different timing implementation of environmental regulation and compare the effects on the markets from a policy innovation perspective. The paper addresses the question: Should a regulator try to commit to a policy (ex-ante regulation) or rather adapt its policy to a firm's decisions (ex-post)? The findings are of interest towards improving regulatory effectiveness and economics efficiencies, e.g. for the transatlantic regional relationship between EU and USA. Our findings highlight differences in policy timing between markets may be harmful. The transatlantic regulators should consider the timing of the policy innovation for the achievement of mutual benefits.

Item Type:Article
Divisions:Henley Business School > Marketing and Reputation
ID Code:76165


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