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The determinants and effects of board nomination committees

Ruigrok, W., Peck, S., Tacheva, S., Greve, P. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2936-4399 and Hu, Y. (2006) The determinants and effects of board nomination committees. Journal of Management & Governance, 10 (2). pp. 119-148. ISSN 1385-3457

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To link to this item DOI: 10.1007/s10997-006-0001-3

Abstract/Summary

This article assesses the corporate governance-related antecedents of nomination committee adoption, and the impact of nomination committees’ existence and their composition on board independence and board demographic diversity. We conducted a longitudinal study of board composition amongst 210 Swiss public companies from January 2001 through December 2003, a period during which the Swiss (Stock) Exchange (SWX) introduced new corporate governance-related disclosure guidelines. We find firms with nomination committees are more likely to have a higher number of independent and foreign directors, but not more likely to have a higher number of female board members. Further, the existence of nomination committees is associated with a higher degree of nationality diversity but is not related to board educational diversity. We also find that nomination committee composition matters in the nomination of independent and foreign, but not of female directors. Our results suggest that understanding different board roles and composition require a multi-theoretical approach, and that agency theory, resource-dependence theory and group effectiveness theory help to explain different aspects of board composition and effectiveness. Finally, the article discusses the concept of diversity and appropriate ways to study diversity in a boardroom context.

Item Type:Article
Refereed:Yes
Divisions:No Reading authors. Back catalogue items
Henley Business School > International Business and Strategy
ID Code:38238
Publisher:Springer

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