Political expenditure cycles and election outcomes: Evidence from disaggregation of public expenditures by economic functionsEnkelmann, S. and Leibrecht, M. (2013) Political expenditure cycles and election outcomes: Evidence from disaggregation of public expenditures by economic functions. Economics Letters, 121 (1). pp. 128-132. ISSN 0165-1765 Full text not archived in this repository. It is advisable to refer to the publisher's version if you intend to cite from this work. See Guidance on citing. To link to this item DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.07.015 Abstract/SummaryWe analyze electorally motivated public spending using disaggregated expenditure data. Election cycles in total expenditures and in specific sub-categories mainly exist in newly democratized Eastern European countries. However, electorally motivated spending policies are ineffective means to enhance the re-election probability.
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