Success and failure in England’s patent system: new evidence from patent applications, 1783-1834

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Billington, S. D. and Lane, J. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0216-1508 (2026) Success and failure in England’s patent system: new evidence from patent applications, 1783-1834. The Economic History Review. ISSN 1468-0289 (In Press)

Abstract/Summary

Our understanding of the relationship between the English patent system and technical change during the Industrial Revolution is based entirely on the study of successful patents. We address this feature by providing the first study of unsuccessful patent applications in England during the First Industrial Revolution. The paper presents a new hand-collected dataset of 722 unsuccessful patent applications filed in England between 1783 and 1834, drawn from archival records of the Home Office. Combined with existing records of granted patents, we employ econometric analysis to empirically investigate the determinants of patent failure. Using natural language processing techniques to measure patent novelty, we find that more novel patents, and patents originating from technological outsiders, were more likely to fail. We also find early failure discouraged applicants from subsequent patenting attempts, although we find no evidence that failed applications were of a lower economic value than successful ones. Our findings are linked to a system of ex ante private opposition of patents, known as caveat opposition, specific to the English patent system at the time. We argue the caveat system served to block threatening competitors rather than filter out low-quality patents. Private opposition, therefore, likely impeded knowledge diffusion during Britain’s Industrial Revolution.

Item Type Article
URI https://centaur.reading.ac.uk/id/eprint/128531
Refereed Yes
Divisions Henley Business School > International Business and Strategy
Publisher Wiley-Blackwell
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